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1. Introduction
Economic growth based on the continuous generation of innovation is a major contribution 
of the Schumpeterian legacy and endogenous growth models (Romer 1990; Rivera-Batiz 
and Romer 1991; Grossman and Helpman 1991; Aghion and Howitt 1992, 1998). The 
subsequent investigation of causes of productivity growth and of differences across regions 
and industries in the productivity dynamics attracted much attention in the past empirical 
investigations. The intensive search of the determinants of total factor productivity (TFP) 
lead to identified such factors as R&D efforts, human capital accumulation, trade open-
ness, financial globalization (Cameron et al. 2005; Biatour and Dumont 2011; Gehringer 
2013; Gehringer et al. 2015).1
Little attention has been paid, so far, to the costs of knowledge. Yet, the empirical 
evidence confirms that the cost of knowledge differs widely over time and across 
countries. The variance of the costs of knowledge takes place also in countries that share 
similar regimes of intellectual property rights where, we can assume, the levels of know-
ledge appropriability are homogeneous. For given and homogeneous levels of knowledge 
appropriability, the difference across countries of knowledge costs can be regarded as a 
reliable measure of the levels of positive pecuniary knowledge externalities that the firms 
of each country can take advantage of.
These differences are likely to be the consequence of the quality of the knowledge 
governance systems at work within each country and of the levels of knowledge connec-
tivity of the system. These differences are likely to be the cause of the innovation capa-
bility of each country and consequently of the rates of increase of its total factor 
productivity.
At the macro level, the unit cost of knowledge was ranging between 0.2 million of 
constant PPP $ in South Korea and New Zealand to 6.2 million of constant PPP $ in 
Belgium, on average between 1985 and 2010. Moreover, such costs were varying over 
time in the majority of the OECD countries in our sample: it was generally lower in the last 
decades of the twentieth century and increased significantly afterwards. We integrate this 
stylized fact into the analysis of productivity dynamics and treat the cost of knowledge as 
a new determining factor of total factor productivity growth. Accordingly, our main 
hypothesis is based on the following argumentation. Where the cost of knowledge is 
higher, more intensive R&D expenditures are needed to generate a piece of technological 
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knowledge. Conversely, where it costs less to engage in innovative activities, relatively 
more new knowledge will be generated, contributing to faster productivity growth. This 
hypothesis seems at the first look to be confirmed by the data, both for individual countries 
and for the average of the OECD sample. Regarding more precisely the development over 
time, although – by their nature – the growth rates of TFP were more volatile, the steadily 
increase in the unit cost of knowledge was accompanied by a diminishing trend of produc-
tivity growth.
The theoretical explanation of the possible link between the cost of knowledge and the 
productivity dynamics relies upon the notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities, 
according to which external technological knowledge, regarded as an indispensable input 
into the generation of new technological knowledge and the eventual introduction of inno-
vations, can be accessed and used at costs that are below equilibrium levels in some specific 
regional, industrial and institutional circumstances. When the private costs of knowledge 
lie below its social value, the unit cost of knowledge-intensive production is lower and the 
output larger than expected. The more intensive are knowledge externalities and the faster 
productivity growth of the system at large.
Our approach and the main contribution to the literature is twofold. First, we construct 
a broad theoretical background showing that both the recent advances of both the 
Schumpeterian and the Arrovian traditions of analysis support our working hypothesis. We 
assume that for homogeneous levels of knowledge appropriability, the costs of knowledge 
have a positive effect on the capability of firms to introduce productivity enhancing 
innovations. We build here upon two complementary models: the knowledge generation 
function (Nelson 1982; Weitzman 1996, 1998) and the material goods production function 
(Griliches 1979) that are put into a unified analytical framework. Subsequently, we empiri-
cally test our model in a panel investigation relative to 20 OECD countries, in the time 
span between 1985 and 2010.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we describe the relevant 
literature creating the conceptual context for our later analysis. Section 3 presents the 
theoretical model, which is then empirically tested in Section 4. Finally, Section 5 provides 
crucial policy implications, whereas the last section concludes.
2. The analytical context
The appreciation of the central role of knowledge externalities in the introduction of 
productivity enhancing innovations is the convergent result of the recent advances of two 
quite separate and yet complementary analytical approaches: i) the ‘rediscovery’ of 
Schumpeterian notion of creative reaction contingent upon the availability of knowledge 
externalities and ii) the Arrovian analysis of technological knowledge. Let us analyze them 
in turn.
2.1 The Schumpeterian ‘creative reaction’
The new appreciation of the essay “The creative response in economic history” published 
by Joseph Alois Schumpeter in the Journal of Economic History in 1947 and ‘almost’ 
forgotten since then enables the reappraisal of the Schumpeterian legacy. The Schumpeterian 
literature has paid much attention to the contribution of Schumpeter (1942) which intro-
duced the notions of limited appropriability of knowledge and the transient duration of the 
monopolistic market powers associated to the introduction of innovations. According to 
Schumpeter (1942) imitative entry cannot be impeded, but only delayed. Imitative entry 
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has direct – negative – effects on the price of innovative products. Limited appropriability, 
as a consequence, exerts negative pecuniary externalities.
With respect to the large literature that impinged upon ‘Capitalism Socialism and 
Democracy’, the attention paid to the “The creative response in economic history” has 
been negligible. Yet Schumpeter (1947) provided quite an original framework where the 
innovation is conceptualized as a creative response rather than the result of a routine or a 
rational plan. The availability of knowledge externalities is regarded as an indispensable 
condition to support the creative reaction and actually introduce technological innovations. 
According to Schumpeter (1947) firms are often exposed to mismatches between the plans 
that are necessary to organize their current business and the actual conditions of product 
and factor markets. Their reaction can be adaptive (or passive) and creative. Passive reac-
tions consist in textbook switching activities on the existing maps of isoquants and adjust-
ment of prices to quantities and vice versa. Passive reactions take place when firms cannot 
take advantage of knowledge externalities. Without pecuniary knowledge externalities, in 
fact, firms might be able to change their products and their processes, but they could not 
introduce technological innovations. Without pecuniary knowledge externalities firms may 
increase the variety of their products and production processes, but cannot introduce 
productivity enhancing innovations (Antonelli 2008).
Their reactions to unexpected mismatches between expectations and actual conditions 
of both product and factor markets are creative when and if relevant pecuniary knowledge 
externalities are available. Only with pecuniary knowledge externalities firms that try and 
react to mismatches that push them in out-of-equilibrium conditions, can introduce actual 
productivity enhancing technological innovations (Antonelli 2008, 2011).
The late essay of Schumpeter uncovers the positive effects of the limited appropria-
bility of knowledge: knowledge spills as it cannot be fully appropriated by the ‘inventor’, 
reduces the price of new products, but yields positive externalities that can benefit all 
inventors. The notion of pecuniary knowledge externalities enables to integrate both the 
contributions of Schumpeter: ‘Capitalism Socialism and Democracy’ and ‘The creative 
response in economic history’. Negative pecuniary knowledge externalities consist in the 
reduction of the prices and hence the revenues stemming from the introduction of an inno-
vation. Positive pecuniary knowledge externalities consist in the reduction of the costs of 
knowledge that is necessary to introduce an innovation. The algebraic sum defines whether 
the levels of net pecuniary knowledge externalities that can be both positive or negative 
(Antonelli 2010).
The reappraisal of the Schumpeterian literature, based upon the appreciation of the 
notion of innovation as a creative response contingent upon the availability of net positive 
pecuniary knowledge externalities, complements and integrates the new developments of 
the Arrovian economics of knowledge.
2.2 The new economics of knowledge
Technological knowledge is a peculiar good as well as a highly idiosyncratic activity. 
Following the pathbreaking analysis of Kenneth Arrow and Richard Nelson it is well 
known that technological knowledge, as an economic good, is characterized by limited 
appropriability, non-exhaustivity, non-rival use, high levels of tacitness, and substantial 
non-divisibility (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962, 1969). Technological knowledge is at the same 
time the output of a dedicated activity and a necessary input not only in the production of 
the other goods, but also in the generation of new technological knowledge (David 1993; 
Crépon, Duguet, Mairesse 1998).
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The generation of technological knowledge, as a consequence, is shaped by the system-
atic recombination of the existing bits of knowledge together with current efforts of 
research, development and learning (R&D&L) activities (Weitzman 1996, 1998; Lucas 
2008).
Intrinsic external and internal cumulability shapes the recombinant generation of tech-
nological knowledge. The basic inputs into the generation of technological knowledge are 
not only the current flows of R&D&L activities performed by each firm, but also the stock 
of existing knowledge generated internally by each firm and externally by the rest of the 
system (Saviotti 2007).
Due to the very characteristics of technological knowledge, its owners are unable to 
fully appropriate their intellectual property and, consequently, knowledge spills to the rest 
of the system. Because of this limited appropriability, knowledge externalities do take 
place (Griliches 1979, 1992). Knowledge externalities, however, only rarely take the form 
of pure externalities. Indeed, the access to the external sources of knowledge is not entirely 
free: because of relevant absorption costs, the case of pecuniary knowledge externalities 
applies instead (Cohen and Levinthal 1990).2
Absorption efforts are necessary to screen the existing knowledge of the other firms, 
identify the components that are indispensable to pursuit the on-going generation of new 
knowledge, access and retrieve them, and, finally, apply their content (Cohen and Levinthal 
1990). Because of the irreducible content of tacitness, the access to the relevant portions of 
existing knowledge is possible only by means of systematic interactions and effective 
communication between knowledge producers and knowledge users. Knowledge interac-
tions on their own are far from free: their successful implementation requires dedicated 
activities that entail specific costs (Lane 2009). The cost of such interactions – involving 
screening, learning, communicating and finally absorbing – is, nevertheless, below the 
social value of knowledge exchanged, so that pecuniary knowledge externalities are 
possible (Gehringer 2011).
The portions of technological knowledge acquired externally are strictly complemen-
tary to the internal knowledge stock and to the current efforts of R&D&L in the recom-
binant generation of new technological knowledge. This means that firms cannot afford 
without external knowledge. Additionally, external knowledge brings about benefits in 
terms of pecuniary knowledge externalities. When and if pecuniary knowledge externali-
ties are available and hence can be accessed, implying costs of external knowledge below 
the equilibrium levels, firms can introduce technological innovations that increase total 
factor productivity levels (Antonelli 2013a).
2.3 Pecuniary knowledge externalities and productivity growth
The two lines of enquiry converge with different motivations and in different analytical 
traditions – respectively the equilibrium and the out-of-equilibrium approach – to articu-
lating the same hypothesis. When firms face un-expected product and factor market condi-
tions, the costs of knowledge play a key role in shaping their reaction. When the costs of 
knowledge are high, firms cope with the out-of-equilibrium conditions by means of substi-
tution processes: they try and adjust quantities to prices moving along the existing maps of 
isoquants. When the costs of knowledge are low, firms try and generate new technological 
knowledge so as to introduce innovations that change the existing map of isoquants. Their 
reaction can be creative only when and if the costs of knowledge are low.
Low knowledge costs make possible to try and introduce innovations rather than 
adjusting quantities to prices and vice versa. In order to introduce innovations, firms 
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activate their knowledge generation processes and make effective use of the external 
knowledge that is available at costs that are below equilibrium levels. Pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities are found in innovation systems characterized by high levels of knowl-
edge connectivity when firms can access and use the existing stocks of knowledge at low 
costs. High knowledge connectivity in turn depends upon the quality of knowledge interac-
tions not only between users and producers, but at large between the variety of agents, 
including firms and research organizations that are part of the system. Strategic alliances 
aimed at implementing the knowledge capability of firms are a key determinant of the 
general levels of knowledge connectivity.
Total factor productivity can be explained only in terms of access to pecuniary knowl-
edge externalities. Pecuniary knowledge externalities in fact provide access to external 
knowledge at costs that are below equilibrium levels. This enables firms to cope with unex-
pected changes in product and factor market conditions in a creative way by means of the 
introduction of technological and organizational innovations.
Total factor productivity measures the mismatch between historic levels actually expe-
rienced and the levels of expected (equilibrium) output. Pecuniary knowledge externalities 
can account for the residual. When the access and use of the external stock of knowledge 
costs less than in the market equilibrium conditions, the reaction of firms can be creative 
and the actual output levels are larger than the expected ones. Here the distinction between 
pure or technical externalities and pecuniary knowledge externalities plays a central 
role. The stock of existing knowledge can be accessed and used as an indispensable input 
into the generation of further knowledge only with the intentional effort of perspective 
users. The access itself does not fall from heaven. It is the result of intentional and 
dedicated activities that entail a cost. Such cost in turn depends not only on the sheer size 
of the stock of knowledge, but also on the structural characteristics of the system and on 
the quality of knowledge governance mechanisms that are in place. If we retain the notion 
of economic systems as rugged landscapes articulated by Krugman (1994 and 1995) 
we see that some systems are endowed with landscapes and connectivity levels (Page 
2011) that are better able than others to make the access to existing knowledge easier and 
less expensive, with larger knowledge externalities, that in turn yield larger occurrence 
of creative reactions, decisions to innovate and ultimately higher rates of total factor 
productivity increase.
3. The cost of knowledge and productivity growth
For given and homogeneous levels of knowledge appropriability, as made possible by 
homogeneous intellectual property right regimes, implemented in the countries taken into 
consideration, the international difference of the costs of knowledge can be regarded as a 
reliable measure of the positive pecuniary knowledge externalities upon which the firms of 
each country can rely in making their creative reaction possible, supporting the generation 
of new technological knowledge and the consequent introduction of productivity enhancing 
innovations.
Building upon these assumptions it is possible to elaborate a simple model, where 
pecuniary knowledge externalities explain both total factor productivity levels and increase. 
The model nests s of two stylized activities: a knowledge generation function and a 
technology production function.
Our knowledge generation function follows the analysis by Nelson (1982) and 
Weitzman (1996, 1998). The stocks of all existing technological knowledge both internal 
and external to each firm are indispensable, strictly complementary inputs, together with 
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R&D activities and the valorization of learning processes in the recombinant generation of 
new technological knowledge.
Internal and the external stocks of existing knowledge can be accessed only if and when 
dedicated resources have been expensed. We can thus write the recombinant knowledge 
generation function and the cost equation of technological knowledge of each firm. The 
knowledge generation function is a standard Cobb-Douglas and takes the following form:
 TK(ISK, ESK, R&D&L) = ISKA ESKB R&D&L∆ (1)
where TK represents new technological knowledge generated with constant returns to scale 
by means of the current efforts in research, development and learning activities (R&D&L), 
the internal stock of knowledge (ISK), the external stock of knowledge (ESK), i.e. the three 
indispensable productive factors. A, B and ∆ are the respective output elasticities of the 
three inputs. The marginal rates of technical substitution of the three factors are:
    
(2)
Denoting with t, u and z the unit price of the respective factors, the cost equation is:
 C = tISK + uESK + zR&D&L (3)
Profits can be defined as:
 π(TK) = sTK(ISK, ESK, R&D&L) – tISK – uESK – zR&D&L (4)
where s is the price of the knowledge output.
The first order conditions of the profit maximization can be obtained by deriving (4) 
with respect to factors ISK, ESK and R&D&L, and putting equal to zero. This can be 
expressed as follows:
    ∂π/∂ISK = s · A · ISKA–1 ESKB R&D&L∆ – t = 0
    ∂π/∂ESK = s · B · ISKA ESKB–1 R&D&L∆ – u = 0 (5)
 ∂π/∂R&D&L = s · ∆ · ISKA ESKB R&D&L∆–1 – z = 0.
From (5), the equilibrium conditions can be rewritten as follows:
 t/u = (A/B)(ESK/ISK)
      z/t = (A/∆)(R&D&L/ISK) (6)
      z/u = (∆/B)(ESK/R&D&L)
It follows that firms select the equilibrium mix of inputs such that the relative unit costs 
are equal to the marginal rate of technical substitution. In some localized, historic, 
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institutional and spatial circumstances, because of the quality of knowledge governance 
mechanisms at work and the high quality of knowledge interactions and communication, 
the unit costs of the access and re-use of the stock of existing knowledge are very low: 
hence th reaction of firms can be creative. Pecuniary knowledge externalities are found 
where and when the localized costs of the stock of external knowledge (u) are below 
socially desirable equilibrium – average – levels (u*).
According to equation (6) it is in fact clear that, when pecuniary knowledge externali-
ties apply, given a certain budget, the firm will chose a combination of inputs biased 
towards a larger stock of external knowledge and a smaller amount of internal stocks of 
knowledge and of current efforts in research and development activities. When pecuniary 
knowledge externalities apply, as a consequence, the firm will be able to generate an 
amount of technological knowledge that is larger than in equilibrium conditions and will 
be able to react creatively so as to generate new technological knowledge at low costs and 
actually introduce technological innovations.
The effects of the larger amount of technological knowledge generated at costs that are 
lower than in equilibrium conditions, has a direct effect on the downstream production of 
all other goods. The recombinant knowledge generation function feeds the technology 
production function.
Following Griliches (1979), in fact, technological knowledge enters directly a standard 
Cobb-Douglas production function of all the other goods with constant returns to scale of 
each firm. Hence:
 Y(K, L, TK) = KαLβTKγ (7)
where K, L and TK are the productive factors and α, β and γ the respective output elastici-
ties. The marginal rates of technical substitution are:
     
(8)
Denoting with r, w and s the unit price of the three indispensable production factors in 
the production of Y, the cost equation is:
 C = rK + wL + sTK (9)
Profits can be defined as:
 π(Y) = pY(K, L, TK) – rK – wL – sTK (10)
where p is the price of the output Y.
The first order conditions can be obtained by deriving (10) with respect to factors K, L 
and TK, and putting equal to zero. This can be expressed as follows:
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  ∂π/∂K = p · α · Kα–1 LβTKγ – r = 0
  ∂π/∂L = p · β · KαLβ–1 TKγ – w = 0 (11)
 ∂π/∂TK = p · γ · Kα Lβ TKγ–1 – s = 0.
From equation (11), the equilibrium conditions are:
 w/r = (β/α) (K/L)
    w/s = (β/γ) (TK/L) (12)
  s/r = (γ/α) (K/TK).
Firms select the equilibrium mix of inputs such that the relative unit costs are equal to 
the marginal rate of technical substitution. Corresponding to these three conditions, the 
profit maximizing firm will identify TK*, K* and L*, i.e. the equilibrium levels of the 
production factors.
With positive pecuniary knowledge externalities in the upstream generation of techno-
logical knowledge and, hence, cheap localized costs of technological knowledge, below 
equilibrium level: s < s*, firms will try and generate new technological knowledge in order 
to introduce innovations. Hence firms will use a technique characterized by higher levels 
of TK and lower levels of both capital and labor: the firm will use a more knowledge inten-
sive technique than the adaptive firms that cannot benefit from pecuniary knowledge exter-
nalities. Most importantly, the firms that benefits from pecuniary knowledge externalities 
will be able to react creatively to unexpected mismatches in both product and factor 
markets. This happens because they can generate new technological knowledge at a cost 
that is below equilibrium, and hence introduce productivity enhancing technological inno-
vations, experiencing an actual increase in their levels of total factor productivity: 
producing an output Y that is larger (and cheaper) than in general equilibrium conditions.
Following Abramovitz (1956), we know that the level of total factor productivity is 
measured by the ratio between the real historic levels of output Y, and the theoretical ones 
calculated as the result of the equilibrium use of production factors:
 A = Y/K*L*TK* (13)
where K*, L* and TK* are the general equilibrium quantities of production factors and A 
measures total factor productivity.
Technological knowledge that has been generated without the availability of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities will yield equilibrium levels of output. In these conditions firms 
can introduce novelties, rather than innovations. Novelties consist in an increase in the 
variety of products and processes, such as changes in production processes, higher levels 
of product differentiation with new characteristics of their products. Novelties differ from 
innovations. The former are produced in equilibrium conditions such that the marginal 
product of inputs matches their costs. Innovations instead yield total factor productivity 
enhancing effects (Link and Siegel 2007).
The results of the modeling exercise can be summarized as it follows: firms produce 
more than expected and hence experience an ‘un-explained’ residual in the actual levels of 
output. The observed levels of output are larger than the expected ones (Y  >Y*), if and 
when the localized costs of the access and secondary use of the stock of existing techno-
logical knowledge in the upstream knowledge generation function are lower than in general 
equilibrium (u < u*). It is clear in fact that, when pecuniary knowledge externalities apply, 
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the output of the recombinant knowledge generation function in terms of technological 
knowledge is larger than in general equilibrium conditions and the costs for the techno-
logical knowledge that enters the downstream Cobb-Douglas technology production func-
tion for all the other goods are also lower (s < s*). Moreover, the lower such costs, the 
stronger the effect of productivity increases. With a given budget, firms that benefit from 
pecuniary knowledge externalities are able to generate a larger amount of technological 
knowledge and hence an amount of all the other goods that is larger than the expected 
levels based upon equilibrium assumptions (Antonelli 2013a).
In such conditions, qualified by positive pecuniary knowledge externalities, each firm 
operates in localized (and transient) equilibrium conditions, but the aggregate output of the 
system is larger than expected in general equilibrium conditions. The working of pecuniary 
knowledge externalities is compatible with short-term, instantaneous equilibrium condi-
tions at the firm level, while at the aggregate level the system is far from equilibrium.
This approach enables to take into account the specific characteristics of the rugged 
landscapes that make pecuniary knowledge externalities actually available. Pecuniary 
knowledge externalities, in fact, are not a ubiquitous, persistent and spontaneous attribute 
of any kind of economic system, at any time. Quite on the opposite, pecuniary knowledge 
externalities are the endogenous result of the specific conditions of the rugged landscapes 
into which external knowledge flows and can be accessed. The actual access to external 
knowledge may take place in highly localized conditions when and where knowledge 
cumulability is actually implemented and supported. Such characteristics, in turn, are a 
consequence of the past generation of technological knowledge and introduction of tech-
nological innovations. As such they are endogenous to the system (Saviotti and Pyka 
2008).
4. Empirical evidence
4.1 The descriptive evidence
The empirical analysis refers to a sample of 20 industrialized OECD countries that imple-
ment and enforce a homogeneous intellectual property right regime3, observed over the time 
span 1985–2010. We assume that the levels of knowledge appropriability are comparable 
across the 20 countries considered. The unit cost of knowledge, as measured by the ratio 
of R&D expenditures to patent, differs widely over time and across countries, regions, 
industries and firms. As Table 1 (column 1) shows, at the macro level, the unit cost 
of knowledge was ranging between 0.2 million of constant PPP $ in South Korea and 
New Zealand to 5.5 million of constant PPP $ in Portugal and 6.2 million in Belgium. 
The variance across the OECD average of 1.9 million is relevant. Moreover, such costs 
were varying over time in the majority of the OECD countries in our sample: it was gener-
ally lower in the first half of the period and increased significantly afterwards (Table 1, 
columns 1 and 2).
This dynamics over time is clearly confirmed in Figure 1. The unit cost of knowledge 
was steadily increasing between 1985 and 2010 for the average of our sample. For the 
growth of TFP the picture is less clear, although a diminishing tendency over time can be 
recognized.
4.2 Estimation strategy
Our focus is on the relationship between the unit cost of knowledge generation and the TFP 
growth. This relationship might in principle go two-ways. On the one hand, and in line with 
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Table 1. Unit cost of knowledge and TFP growth in OECD countries, 1985–2010.
Unit cost of knowledge TFP growth
Country 1985–2010 1985–1998 1999–2010 1985–2010 1985–1998 1999–2010
Australia 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 0.5
Austria 1.8 1.1 2.6 1.4 1.3 1.4
Belgium 6.2 3.4 9.0 0.8 1.2 0.3
Canada 0.5 0.4 0.6 0.4 0.2 0.5
Denmark 1.7 1.1 2.5 0.8 1.1 0.3
Finland 1.5 0.6 2.6 1.8 2.2 1.2
France 2.1 1.9 2.4 1.0 1.4 0.6
Germany 1.1 1.1 1.1 0.9 1.2 0.7
Ireland 1.3 0.5 2.1 2.7 3.5 1.8
Italy 1.8 1.6 2.0 0.4 1.0 –0.3
Japan 0.3 0.3 0.3 1.4 1.8 0.9
Korea 0.2 0.3 0.2 3.8 4.3 3.3
Netherlands 3.4 2.9 3.9 1.0 0.9 1.1
New Zealand 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.4
Portugal 5.5 2.6 8.8 1.3 2.5 0.6
Spain 2.8 1.9 3.9 0.5 1.0 –0.1
Sweden 2.5 1.3 3.4 0.9 0.7 1.2
Switzerland 2.3 1.4 3.4 0.0 –0.6 0.4
UK 1.1 0.9 1.3 0.8 0.8 0.7
US 1.1 1.3 0.9 1.1 0.9 1.4
average OECD 1.9 1.3 2.6 1.1 1.4 0.8
Note: Unit cost of knowledge is calculated as the ratio between the total R&D expenditures in million of constant 
(2005) PPP $ and the number of patent applications made to WIPO. TFP growth is the growth rate of multi-factor 
productivity in per cent.
Source: own calculations based on the IPER database build upon OECD STAN and World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) data.
Figure 1. Development of TFP growth and of the unit cost of knowledge on average of 20 OECD 
countries, 1985–2010.
Note: See note of Table 1.
Source: own calculations based on the IPER database build upon OECD STAN and WIPO data.
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our previous argument, where the cost of knowledge is lower, the more intensive and stronger 
will be pecuniary knowledge externalities and the faster should be the growth of TFP. On the 
other hand, in a context characterized by a positive dynamics of TFP, the costs of knowledge 
generation are likely to decrease due to the more extensive availability of newly generated 
external knowledge. Although we believe that this second mechanism is less likely to be true, 
or at least not on a regular basis, we account for this potential simultaneity by applying the 
instrumental variable method (also called two stage least squares, 2SLS), where the cost of 
knowledge is treated as an endogenous regressor and needs to be instrumented.
It is a common problem to find variables serving as valid instruments, in the sense of 
being satisfactorily exogenous with respect to the dependent variable and at the same time 
strongly correlated with the endogenous regressors. If instruments are weak, the precision 
of instrumental variable estimations is lower than that of simple OLS regressions. On the 
other hand, if endogenous regressors are included in the estimation, OLS results will be 
biased. As we suspect – and confirm with a test – that endogeneity could be an issue in our 
framework, we aim to explicitly deal with it, but at the same time assure that our procedure 
doesn’t lead to loss of precision of our estimations.
In order to implement this approach, our econometric model is based upon a system of 
two equations: the cost of knowledge equation and the total factor productivity equation, 
where the second-step TFP growth equation includes the fitted values of knowledge cost 
from the first step. The two-step model can be represented in the following system:
     (14)
          (15)
The first step described in equation (14) consists in testing the key hypothesis that the 
cost of knowledge (CK) reflects the density of the stock of existing knowledge (STOCK). 
Each firm at each point in time will be better able to generate technological knowledge the 
larger the amount of pecuniary knowledge externalities. The latter in turn are likely to stem 
diachronically from the stock of existing knowledge. Hence we expect that the costs of 
knowledge in a country are lower, the larger is the stock of patents per capita. In addition 
to the two aforementioned instruments (the so called excluded instruments), we include the 
first and the second lag of the dependent variable. Vector  is the set of exogenous covari-
ates that should be include in both the first and the second stage (Angrist and Pischke 
2008). Finally, τ
t
 and ρ
i
 are the time and country specific effects, whereas ε
it
 is the indiosyn-
cratic error term.
A comment is due here to our measure of the cost of knowledge. This is captured by 
the R&D expenditures made in a country per unit of patent and thus most closely refers to 
what we called in our theoretical discussion ‘internal cost of knowledge’. Ideally, we 
would be willing to have a measure of cost that is an average between internal and external 
cost of knowledge generation, where external cost refers to the cost necessary to support 
when acquiring knowledge from sources external to the own business. However, there are 
insuperable limits in finding such a measure and we are constrained to stick to R&D expen-
ditures only.4 This notwithstanding, even for our R&D unit cost variable, our main hypoth-
esis always holds: given the availability of pecuniary knowledge externalities, in any 
instant of time firms face a cost advantage associated with external knowledge, which 
provides them the incentive to adjust their production plans towards a higher relative 
implementation of external versus internal knowledge. It follows thus that the more 
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abundant are knowledge externalities, the lower should be the unit cost of (internal) knowl-
edge and the higher will be productivity growth.
In the second step, we account for the endogeneity of the costs of knowledge within the 
productivity equation. In order to validate our instrumenting strategy, we implement 
different post estimation diagnostics (precisely, weak instruments test, over-identification 
test, redundancy test), reported at the bottom of the results tables. Additionally, we check 
whether our excluded instrumental variables affect the dependent variable only indirectly, 
by including them as regressors in the estimations of TFP growth.5 We could confirm that 
these variables were not directly influential on TFP growth and, thus, the exclusion restric-
tion cannot be rejected.6
More precisely regarding the second stage, in addition to our main explanatory vari-
able, we account for other possible factors determining TFP growth, as suggested in the 
past literature. Finally, our econometric model assumes the following form:
     (16)
where ∆TFP
it
 is the annual growth rate of TFP in country i at time t,  is our variable of 
interest expressing the unit cost of knowledge generation, HC
it
 is a measure of human 
capital stock available in an economy, TO
it
 refers to a measure of trade openness and GDP/
cap
it
 refers to national income per capita. The detailed description of the variables and the 
indication of the data source are offered in Table 2.
Coefficient β
1
 is a constant, whereas coefficients β
2
 to β
5
 are supposed to measure the 
marginal contribution of each factor to TFP growth. Finally, ϑ
t
 and µ
i
 are the time and 
country dummies, respectively, whereas ε
it
 is the idiosyncratic error term.
To justify our set of control variables, the motivation to include a measure of trade 
openness, as expressed in terms of the share of the overall trade volume (imports plus 
Table 2. Variables used in the estimations: description and data sources.
Variable Description Source
∆(TFP) Growth rate of TFP OECD.stat
CK Cost of knowledge, measured in terms of the 
ratio between R&D spending and the 
number of patent applications in a country 
each year between 1985–2010
Own calculation based  
on OECD.stat (R&D 
spending) and WIPO 
(patent applications)
TO Openness to trade measured as the ratio 
between the sum of imports and exports over 
GDP
Penn World Tables 7.1
HC Human capital: R&D personnel per 1000 of 
employment
OECD.stat
GDP/cap GDP per capita Own calculation based on 
Penn World Tables 7.1
Excluded instrument:
STOCK Patent stock per capita Patent stock comes from 
own calculations 
applying the Perpetual 
Inventory Method on 
annual patent applica-
tions to WIPO*
Note: * A detailed description of the method is included in Appendix B.
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exports) relative to the size of the economy (GDP), derives from the fact that the intensi-
fying trade integration between economies has been often argued to have a positive impact 
on productivity growth. This impact can be direct – when the trade flows (particularly 
export) take place in technology intensive sectors – and indirect – through the acquisition 
of specialized technological skills, as a consequence of interactions between the trade part-
ners (see López 2005 for a survey of the related literature).
The inclusion of human capital directly derives from the models of endogenous 
growth, supportive for the positive role in the growth process played by the accumulation 
of skills (Lucas 1998). We measure the stock of human capital as the ratio of the R&D 
personnel for 1000 of employees. In that way, we aim to capture the influence of the skilled 
labor that most intensively is involved in innovative processes.7
Finally, we include GDP per capita, in order to account for the convergence process. 
More precisely, economies that are at a relatively lower stage of their economic develop-
ment (corresponding to a lower GDP per capita level) are supposed to experience a rela-
tively faster productivity growth. Alternatively, another way to control for the possible 
differences in economic development and their influence on the speed of productivity 
growth, one could include the initial levels of TFP. Accordingly, we checked this hypoth-
esis as well (see the results below), but the coefficient on this variable, although reporting 
the right sign, was never significant.
Table 3 presents the summary statistics of the variables included into estimations. 
Regarding the main variables of interest, the average annual growth rate of TFP was equal 
to 1.1%, ranging between the minimum of –7.8% to a maximum of 7.8%. The unit cost of 
knowledge was on average equal to almost 2 millions of constant PPP $, with a minimum 
of 0.09 and a maximum of 10.9 millions of PPP $.
4.2. Results
Table 4 summarizes the results of the estimations of equation (16). We report the results 
from four different methods. In column 1, we show the estimation results from a pooled 
OLS method. In columns 2 and 3, we estimate analogous specifications with methods 
explicitly accounting for the panel structure of our dataset, namely, random effects and 
fixed effects model. The results from these three methods serve to sort out the direction of 
the bias with respect to the instrumental variable estimates (i.e. 2SLS) reported in columns 
4–6.
More precisely regarding the IV estimations, we first estimate a model where we 
include only the instrumented knowledge cost variable (column 4). This is to show the 
direct impact of the variable of interest on TFP growth. In other words, this is the effect of 
Table 3. Summary statistics.
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
∆(TFP) 469 1.11 1.71 –7.8 7.8
CK 451 1.96 2.08 0.09 10.93
TO 520 69.16 33.90 16.00 183.30
HC 404 10.77 4.05 2.44 24.73
GDP/cap 520 27559.24 6731.22 7352.31 47134.06
STOCK 484 7471.04 11062.42 150.15 58820.32
R&D 457 554.91 281.11 42.07 1265.10
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Table 4. Results of the estimations of the link between the cost of knowledge generation and 
productivity dynamics.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
POLS RE FE IV IV IV
CK –0.274*** –0.196*** –0.199*** –0.342*** –0.354*** –0.354***
(0.044) (0.071) (0.087) (0.090) (0.079) (0.079)
TO 0.018*** 0.021*** 0.029** 0.025*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.007) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
HC 0.039* 0.062* 0.081 0.053 0.053
(0.021) (0.036) (0.050) (0.054) (0.054)
GDP/cap –0.120** –0.089** –0.088** –0.144
(0.020) (0.025) (0.042) (0.030)***
Initial TFP –51.05
(82.64)
N. obs. 360 360 360 280 255 255
R-sq. (overall) 0.422 0.389 0.337 0.585 0.632 0.632
Hansen J 0.111 0.993 0.993
Weak identif. 185.64 145.18 142.00
Endogeneity 
test
0.014 0.009 0.009
Redundancy 
test
0.009 0.004 0.004
First stage results for the excluded instruments:
STOCK –0.00002*** –0.00002*** –0.00003***
(5.73e-06) (7.47e-06) (7.47e-06)
CK
t–1
0.813*** 0.788*** 0.788***
(0.050) (0.053) (0.053)
CK
t–2
–0.015 –0.067** –0.067**
(0.020) (0.027) (0.027)
Partial R-sq. 0.848 0.837 0.837
Note: Dependent variable is the growth rate of TFP. In column 1, pooled OLS results are shown. In columns 2 and 
3, panel data random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE) models are estimated. In columns 4–6 IV (2SLS) estima-
tions are reported. The endogenous regressor, CK, is instrumented with its first and second lag, as well as with 
patent stock per capita and R&D expenditures per capita. Weak identification test reports the Kleibergen-Paap rk 
Wald F statistics. Hansen J is the Chi-sq. p value of the overidentification test of all instruments. Endogeneity test 
reports the p-value of the Chi-squared test having under the null the hypothesis that CK is exogenous. Redun-
dancy test reports p-value of the Chi-squared test that checks, whether the excluded instruments (patent stock per 
capita and R&D expenditures per capita) are redundant. Partial R-sq. refers to the goodness-of-fit of the excluded 
instruments. In all specifications, time and country specific effects are included. Heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation robust statistics are reported.
the cost of knowledge disconnected from the influence coming from other factors. We then 
include such other factors in the subsequent two specifications. In column 5, openness to 
trade, human capital and GDP per capita are considered. Finally, in column 6, the latter 
variable is replaced with the initial value of TFP.
As the endogeneity test regarding the endogenous regressor (CK) in all cases and at all 
conventional significance levels clearly rejects the null hypothesis of exogeneity, the IV 
specifications are preferred over those run according to the alternative methods, OLS, RE 
and FE. Regarding the direction of bias, the latter methods seem to underestimate the effect 
of knowledge cost on TFP growth. Moreover, considering the other tests reported (Hansen 
J test of validity of the overidentifying restrictions and the Kleibergen-Paap test of weak 
instruments), they suggest that the IV estimations are correctly specified.8
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The results clearly suggest that the effect of knowledge cost on TFP growth is negative, 
meaning that the higher the unit cost of generating new knowledge the lower the rate of 
growth of TFP. In quantitative terms, this impact ranges between –0.35 and –0.36, 
depending on the control variables included. If the unit cost of knowledge increases by one 
unit (corresponding to one million of 2005 constant PPP $), this leads to a 0.35–0.36 
percentage point decrease in the growth rate of TFP. Consequently, given that between 
1999 and 2010 the unit cost of knowledge for the average of the OECD countries in our 
sample increased by around 1.3 million of PPP $, this contributed to the reduction in the 
growth rate of TFP by approximately 0.42 percentage points. If the cost of knowledge 
remained unchanged at the average level from the pre-period (1985–1998), then ceteris 
paribus TFP would have grown on average between 1999 and 2010 at the rate of 1.2%.
Regarding the other factors explaining the TFP growth, trade openness was positively 
contributing to speeding up TFP growth. Human capital variable, although reporting the 
expected positive sign, remained always insignificant. Finally, the convergence hypothesis 
seems to be confirmed by the negative sign of the coefficient corresponding to GDP per 
capita. Accordingly, countries experiencing lower levels of GDP per capita could register 
higher TFP growth rates. This same direction of influence, although with insignificant esti-
mated coefficient, is found for the variable measuring the initial level of TFP.
Finally, the results of the first stage estimation relative to the excluded instruments are 
also reported. They confirm that the cost of knowledge diminishes as stock of the existing 
knowledge increases.
5. Conclusions and policy implications
The empirical evidence, based upon a representative group of 20 OECD countries for the 
considerable stretch of 26 years, comprised between 1985 and 2010, has confirmed that 
knowledge costs, as measured by the ratio of total research and development expenditures 
to patents, vary widely across countries and over time. Moreover, this variation explains 
much of the dynamics in the growth rate of total factor productivity. In particular, where 
and when knowledge costs are lower, TFP growth is faster.
This evidence confirms the intuition, elaborated in this chapter, that knowledge costs 
are a key determinant of the capability of a system to support the creative reaction of firms 
and the rates of introduction of productivity enhancing innovations. For given levels of 
knowledge appropriability, the costs of knowledge depend upon the connectivity of the 
system. Countries that have been able to elaborate efficient knowledge governance mecha-
nisms, making possible to firms to access and use – again – the existing stocks of knowl-
edge, experience faster rates of introduction of technological innovations and higher levels 
of total factor productivity growth.
Pecuniary knowledge externalities are indeed external to each firm, but endogenous to 
the system. At each point in time and in space, in fact, the levels of pecuniary knowledge 
externalities do not fall from heaven like manna but depend upon the amount of innovative 
efforts made by agents in the system and knowledge connectivity of the system as shaped 
by the structure of knowledge interactions and transaction that relate each firm to the others 
and the business sector to the public research infrastructure.
The access to the stock of existing knowledge, in fact, is neither free nor automatic nor 
homogeneous across economic systems. It depends upon quality of the rugged landscapes into 
which the generation of technological knowledge takes place and it requires a wide range of 
dedicated activities including searching, screening, decoding, interacting and learning. The 
innovative capability of a system is influenced by the levels of its knowledge connectivity.
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The policy implications of our analysis are most important. The improvement of the 
knowledge governance mechanisms aimed at increasing the knowledge connectivity of the 
system should be a crucial ingredient of innovation policymaking. The new strategic alli-
ances play a central role in this context as they enable the direct and systematic interaction 
between the academic sources of scientific knowledge and their users contributing to the 
persistent access to the external stock of existing knowledge at low costs and hence to the 
reduction of the cost of knowledge generation. Consequently, they yield substantial support 
to the eventual increase of the rate of introduction of innovations and are able to account 
for the persistent increase of the general efficiency of the economic system.
Knowledge transfer policy interventions finalized to increase the knowledge connec-
tivity of the system and hence to favor the transfer, dissemination and actual access to the 
stock of existing knowledge may be very effective as their ultimate effects is the reduction 
of the cost of knowledge, the increase of pecuniary knowledge externalities and the even-
tual increase of total factor productivity.
Such knowledge transfer policy interventions should primarily focus the large public 
research infrastructures, with the aim to make the technological knowledge generated by 
the public research system better accessible to perspective users. The systematic encour-
agement to academic departments to enter the markets for knowledge intensive business 
services can help small and medium sized firms to take advantage of the stock of knowl-
edge existing within the academic walls. At the individual level, the extension of the 
professors’ privilege so as to favor their professional activity in the markets for knowledge 
intensive business services should increase the interactions of the scientific personnel with 
the business community and put in motion the exchange of creative and praxis oriented 
ideas. In this context the new strategic alliances are a major organizational innovation that 
helps increasing the knowledge connectivity of the system favoring the reduction of the 
costs of knowledge.
More intense interactions and transactions between the public research system and the 
business community favored by the new strategic alliances, help to better focus the research 
activity of the public research system directing it towards scientific fields that are more 
likely to yield ‘useful’ knowledge. The identification of the appropriate portfolio of 
research activities able to pursue scientific progress and yet to contribute economic growth 
is a major problem of the public research system. The feedback from the business commu-
nity expressed by the intensity of academic outsourcing and knowledge transactions may 
provide useful signals to grasp the actual scope of application of the different scientific 
fields.
With respect to the private sector knowledge transfer, policy interventions should 
focus on intellectual property right regimes. The introduction of subsidies to the purchase 
of intellectual property rights, next to the classical subsidies to the funding of R&D activi-
ties, might help the dissemination of the existing stock of knowledge and its easier access, 
helping the deepening of transactions in the markets for intellectual property rights with 
positive effects on both the demand and the supply side. The further reduction of the 
constraints of competition policies can favor the cooperation between knowledge users and 
knowledge producers along chain values increasing knowledge interactions. As a third 
step, the structure of intellectual property right regimes might be reconsidered with respect 
to their exclusivity. The intellectual property right regimes play an important role. 
Exclusive, long-lasting intellectual property right regimes may delay the access to the 
stock of existing knowledge to the point that perspective users may prefer to re-invent the 
existing bur non-accessible knowledge. For given levels of the stock of existing knowledge 
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the systems endowed with an organized architecture of knowledge interactions and trans-
actions may experience higher levels of pecuniary knowledge externalities that systems 
where knowledge interactions and transactions are made expensive by lack of trust and 
excess opportunism.
The weakening of intellectual property rights might entail a reduction in the incentives 
to generate technological knowledge with the ultimate perverse effect of increasing the 
access to existing knowledge and hence reducing both the costs of knowledge but 
decreasing the incentives and hence the amount of knowledge actually generated. The 
introduction of compulsory licensing based upon the reduction of the exclusivity of intel-
lectual property rights accompanied by the identification of correct levels of royalties, 
however, might help the knowledge connectivity of the system favoring the dissemination 
of existing knowledge yet defending its appropriability. The identification of the correct 
levels of royalties is clearly crucial to combine the need to secure the rewards to innova-
tors, with the goal of increasing as much as possible the social surplus stemming from the 
introduction of innovations (Antonelli 2013b).
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Notes
1. See Gehringer et al. (2014) for an overview of the relevant literature.
2. The distinction between pure (or technological) externalities and pecuniary externalities 
dates back to Tibor Scitovski. Pure externalities are found when inputs can be used at no costs. 
Pecuniary externalities take place when the actual costs of an input, in a specific and localized 
condition, are lower than in equilibrium conditions (Scitovski 1954; Antonelli 2008).
3. The countries included are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
4. There are other problems with this measure of knowledge cost as well. First, not all R&D activi-
ties internal to the firms are aimed to patent production, as they might end in other productive 
outcomes, like trade secrets, trademarks or other legally unprotected forms of innovation. This 
potentially leads us to over-estimate the true cost of knowledge. Second, not all patents needs 
formal R&D expenditures, yet other forms of innovative investment. There might be patented in-
cremental innovations obtained without R&D efforts. This could lead us to underestimate the real 
cost of knowledge. Finally and related to the previous two points, we standardize our total cost of 
knowledge by the number of patents, whereas other non-patented innovations are common.
5. For brevity, we do not report the results of the aforementioned estimations here. They are avail-
able upon request.
6. This is also confirmed by the very low pair-wise correlation between the excluded instruments 
and DTFP, as shown in the correlation matrix in Table A.1 in Appendix A.
7. It is not easy to find a good variable measuring the stock of human capital available in the 
economy. It has been a common practice in the past literature to measure human capital in terms 
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of secondary school attainment. Nevertheless, it can be argued that it is a too broad definition 
of human capital and more qualified and more specific skills are essential when trying to grasp 
the influence of human capital on productivity. Consequently, our measure of human capital ex-
presses an attempt in this direction. However, it can be argued that human capital is a measure of 
R&D intensity and as such could be correlated with our measure of unit cost of knowledge. We 
checked for this possibility and found a very low and insignificant correlation between the two.
8. More precisely, the Hansen J test regresses the residuals from the IV estimation on all instru-
ments (included and excluded). The null hypothesis is then that all instruments are uncorre-
lated with the residuals. Thus, given that we cannot reject the null, we can conclude that our 
overidentifying restrictions are valid. The Kleibergen-Paap rk Wald F test statistic refers to the 
weak identification test proposed by Stock and Yogo (2005). The test statistic is confronted 
with (different levels of) the rejection rate r that the researcher tolerates. Under the null, the test 
rejects too often. To reject the null, the F test statistic must exceed the critical value. In our case, 
we are always able to reject the null.
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Appendix A
Table A.1 Correlation matrix between the excluded instruments and the dependent variable.
∆TFP STOCK CK CK
t–1
CK
t–2
∆TFP 1
STOCK –0.011 1
CK –0.193 –0.304 1
CK
t–2
–0.190 –0.304 0.980 1
CK
t–2
0.083 –0.069 0.052 0.051 1
Appendix B
The calculation of the stock of patents is based on the perpetual inventory method, analogously linke 
in the case of calculation of the stock of tangible capital (see, for instance, Gehringer 2013). 
Accordingly, the stock of patents in each year t in country i is given by
 STOCK
it
 = (1 – δ)STOCK
it–1
 + FLOW
it
 (A.1)
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where FLOW
it
 measures the current flow of patents and δ is a depreciation rate assumed constant and 
equal to 0.06. Moreover, the initial level of the patent stock, STOCK
i0
, is computed as
            (A.2)
where g is a geometric average of the growth rate of investment over the whole period for which data 
on each year patent applications are available. This period ranges for the majority of countries in our 
sample between 1963 and 2011, with the exception of Australia (1995–2011), Belgium (1965–2011), 
Canada (1960–2011), Korea (1960–2011), Netherlands (1960–2011) and Spain (1965–2011).
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